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U.S. DEFENSE CONTRACTS DURING THE TAX 
EXPENDITURE BATTLES OF THE 1980s
Susan J. Guthrie and James R. Hines Jr.
This paper considers the impact of the tax treatment of military contractors on the 
cost and timing of U.S. military procurement. Prior to the early 1980s, taxpayers 
were permitted to defer tax obligations on profi ts earned from long-term contracts. 
Legislation passed in 1982, 1986, and 1987 required that at least 70 percent of the 
profi ts earned on long-term contracts be taxed as accrued, thereby signifi cantly re-
ducing the tax benefi ts associated with long term contracting. Comparing contracts 
that were ineligible for these tax benefi ts with those that were eligible, it appears 
that between 1981–1989 the duration of U.S. Department of Defense contracts 
shortened by an average of between one and two months, or somewhere between 10 
and 23 percent of average contract length. This pattern implies that the tax benefi ts 
associated with long term contracts promoted artifi cial contract lengthening in the 
1980s, and suggests that the Department of Defense ignores the federal income tax 
consequences of its procurement actions, thereby indirectly rewarding contractors 
who benefi t from tax expenditures.
Keywords: completed contract method, defense procurement, tax expenditures
JEL Codes: H25, H57, D86
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. government taxes the incomes earned by individuals and corporations, but the tax laws occasionally provide for deviations from strict income taxation, with 
these deviations loosely grouped in the category of “tax expenditures.” Tax expenditure 
provisions commonly reduce tax obligations associated with the production and sale 
of goods and services, the benefi ts of which are ultimately shared between producers, 
who enjoy greater after-tax profi ts, and consumers, who benefi t from lower prices.
U.S. federal and state governments are major consumers of goods and services, includ-
ing in many cases goods and services whose prices are affected by applicable federal 
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tax provisions. Often one part of the federal government offers tax subsidies to fi rms 
whose output is purchased by another part of the federal government. In this setting, it 
is not diffi cult to imagine outcomes in which the procurement arm of the government 
responds to lower prices by increasing its consumption of subsidized goods and services, 
unmindful of the fact that their low prices are due to benefi ts paid for by another part of 
the government. The importance of this tax-induced procurement substitution, and how it 
can be distinguished from other aspects of government purchasing decisions, are unclear.
This paper considers the impact of tax changes in 1982, 1986, and 1987 that reduced 
certain benefi ts associated with long-term contracting. These benefi ts arise when a 
low- or zero-tax entity (such as the government) purchases certain goods or services 
from high-tax providers using contracts that extend beyond a taxable year. Under the 
“completed contract” method of accounting, the income earned on such contracts is not 
taxed until the fi nal year of the contract. The availability of this method of accounting 
was reduced in three separate tax reforms starting in 1982, and it appears that as a result 
the U.S. Department of Defense signifi cantly reduced its procurement of goods and 
services that were formerly eligible for signifi cant income tax deferral.
Firms providing goods and services under long term contracts often fi nd that their 
ultimate revenue stream is uncertain, as production encounters unforeseen costs or 
obstacles, and mismatches with buyer expectations require that fi nal products be modi-
fi ed subsequent to delivery. Hence, a fi rm might appear profi table in the early years of 
a long-term contract, as the buyer pays for partial completion, but upon concluding the 
contract the fi rm might fi nd that it has taken a signifi cant loss. Given these uncertain-
ties, Congress prior to 1982 was unwilling to require taxpayers to include long-term 
contracting profi ts in income prior to contract completion and acceptance. Taxpayers 
electing to account for profi ts under this “completed contract” method of accounting 
did not include contract income, and buyers did not deduct contract payments, until 
contracts were complete. Since contracts are generally profi table, the tax deferral avail-
able from the use of the completed contract method of accounting effectively subsidized 
long-term contracts whenever those performing the contracts were subject to tax rates 
lower than or equal to the tax rates of buyers. This included most importantly cases 
in which taxable entities performed contract work for nonprofi t organizations or the 
government, but was not limited to these situations.1
The completed contract method of accounting was modifi ed and its benefi ts signifi -
cantly curtailed in a series of legislative reforms in 1982, 1986, and 1987. These reforms 
were motivated by a perception on the part of Congress that use of the completed 
contract method of accounting excessively subsidized certain contractors, particularly 
those doing work for the U.S. Department of Defense (Joint Committee on Taxation, 
1987). In the wake of the generous tax provisions of the Economic Recovery Tax Act 
1 Tax rates may differ between buyers and contractors for numerous reasons — for example, if one is a 
corporation and the other a partnership, or if one of the parties has tax loss carryforwards, or if the tax 
treatment of contract income and expenses differs between the parties (e.g., contractors providing goods 
that buyers have to capitalize and depreciate for tax purposes).
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of 1981, subsequent legislative developments in the 1980s were designed to reduce 
many of the tax expenditures in the Internal Revenue Code, including the completed 
contract method of accounting.
One of the notable features of the completed contract method of accounting is that the 
primary benefi ciaries of this accounting method were believed to be taxpayers working 
on contracts for the U.S. Department of Defense. Since the U.S. federal government 
both subsidized these contracts with favorable tax accounting and fi nanced the contracts 
with direct defense outlays, it is not entirely clear why the accounting method per se was 
considered to be a subsidy. If all parties are rational, and if those issuing the contracts on 
behalf of the U.S. government incorporate tax revenue losses due to favorable contract 
accounting, then the subsidy available from using the completed contract method of 
accounting would be entirely recouped in other contract terms, presumably in the form 
of lower prices paid on these contracts. If these conditions hold, then there would be no 
reason to expect that reducing the favorable treatment of long term contracts would be 
accompanied by changes other than higher prices for the goods and services provided 
under these contracts.
The contracting process used for Department of Defense procurement, however, 
refl ects problems of hidden and incomplete information that infl uence many contracting 
situations. The government seeks to obtain the best value for its money in settings in 
which it cannot be certain just how costly it is for private fi rms to provide it with goods 
and services, while the providers, who may have better information on their own costs, 
nevertheless face considerable uncertainty over what their ultimate contract costs will 
be. In such settings even the most effi cient contracts do not resolve all of the associ-
ated problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (Cummins, 1977; Laffont and 
Tirole, 1993; Rogerson, 1989, 1990, 1995), and in particular, ample scope remains for 
strategic manipulation of reported contract costs (Rogerson, 1992; Thomas and Tung, 
1992; Naegelen and Mougeot, 1998). In practice, there appears to be little evidence 
of strategic cost shifting in defense contracts (McGowan and Vendrzyk, 2002), and 
the incompleteness of the contracts that the Department of Defense signs with private 
contractors is consistent with effi cient accommodation to the underlying design and 
performance uncertainties of modern weapon systems (Crocker and Reynolds, 1993).
The scaling back of the tax benefi ts associated with long term contracting infl uences 
Department of Defense contracts in two ways. The fi rst is that, for given contract speci-
fi cations, providing goods and services under long term contracts becomes less attractive 
to contractors, who will require — and, in the course of the competitive bidding process, 
get — higher pretax prices. If the Department of Defense ignores the impact of its actions 
on federal income tax collections, then price increases will reduce its demand for the 
types of goods and services most affected by the tax change, which are those that tend 
to be provided with contracts of longest duration. Lichtenberg (1989) estimates that the 
average price elasticity of demand for Department of Defense weapon systems in the 
1980s was 0.55, which implies that purchases of goods and services typically provided 
over long contract periods should decline relative to purchases of goods and services 
typically provided over short contract periods. The second effect of the tax change is 
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to reduce incentives for contractors and the Department of Defense jointly to lengthen 
contracts for any given goods and services in order to produce tax savings that they can 
share. The Department of Defense is generally willing  to delay procurement in return 
for a suffi cient discount, and contractors are similarly willing to delay production in 
return for tax and other benefi ts (Peck and Scherer, 1962; Scherer, 1964; and Hartley, 
2007). Reducing the tax benefi ts associated with long term contracting should dampen 
the tendency to lengthen contracts artifi cially. Together, these two effects imply that the 
Department of Defense should face higher procurement prices for goods and services 
produced under long term contracts, and contracts of shorter average duration; Guthrie 
and Hines (2008) offer an analytic derivation of these implications. These predictions 
rely on the assumption that military contractors benefi t from the completed contract 
method of accounting; contractors that are tax exempt or otherwise face low tax rates 
should be largely unaffected.
While it is diffi cult to compare prices of military contracts in different years, given 
the changing nature of goods and services demanded by the government, it is not dif-
fi cult to compare contract lengths. This paper focuses on contracts entered into by the 
Department of Defense in 1981 and 1989. It fi nds that, after controlling for observable 
contract attributes, contracts that were likely to be affected by the accounting changes 
in 1982, 1986, and 1987 shortened by one to two months compared to contracts that 
were not likely to be affected, corresponding to a 10–23 percent reduction in contract 
length. This sensitivity of contract provisions to the federal income tax treatment of 
contractors suggests that the Department of Defense did not fully internalize its impact 
on federal tax revenues in making contracting decisions.
II. THE TAX EXPENDITURE BATTLES OF THE 1980s
Taxpayers with income earned from long term contracts can choose among alternative 
methods of accounting for their contract income and expenses. Long term contracts 
consist of building, installation, construction, and manufacturing contracts that span 
more than a single tax year. The types of manufacturing contracts that qualify for long-
term status are further limited to those for the manufacture of unique items (e.g., those 
not normally carried in the contractor’s fi nished good inventories), or for items that 
require more than 12 months to complete.
Prior to 1983, taxpayers with income derived from long-term contracts could choose 
from the percentage of completion method, the completed contract method, or any of the 
other more general accounting methods available for reporting contract income. Under 
the percentage of completion method, costs derived from the contract are deducted in 
the period in which they are incurred, while revenues are allocated over the life of the 
contract in proportion to the percent of the contract that is complete (measured either by 
percentage of physical completion or percentage of ultimate costs incurred). In contrast, 
under the completed contract method, revenue and costs that are directly allocable to 
the contract are reported in the year the contract is completed, and costs that are not 
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directly allocable to the contract are deducted in the period in which they are incurred.2 
Given the tax signifi cance of contract completion, there were conspicuous disputes and 
inconsistent rulings between courts over the point at which expenses could be taken and 
contract income reported,3 which created pressure on Congress to enact rules clarifying 
and possibly limiting application of the completed contract method. 
Congress’s fi rst signifi cant opportunity came in 1982, when reaction to the gener-
ous provisions of the 1981 tax cut prompted new legislation designed to raise revenue 
and reduce some of the perceived inequities in the tax system. The Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 modifi ed the completed contract method to align 
its measurement of income more closely with the economic income attributable to 
long term contracts. In the case of extended-period long term contracts (contracts that 
last more than 24 months), some previously defi ned period costs were reclassifi ed as 
contract costs, thus requiring them to be carried forward and accounted for at the time 
the contract is completed. These modifi cations took effect December 31, 1982, with a 
phase-out of the deductibility of the newly classifi ed contract costs over a three-year 
period.
Four years later, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 made sweeping changes to the U.S. 
federal income tax, generally in the direction of drastically reducing tax expenditures, 
broadening the tax base, and lowering marginal tax rates (U.S. Government Account-
ability Offi ce, 2005). Many favorable accounting methods were swept up in these 
reforms, which included broad changes in the use of the percentage of completion and 
completed contract accounting methods for reporting income derived from long-term 
contracts. One year prior to passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation (1985) estimated that the annual tax expenditure (foregone revenue) 
from use of the completed contract method of accounting would be $4.9 billion in 
1986, rising to $7.0 billion by 1990. These are sizable tax expenditures, exceeding 
in magnitude the contemporaneous tax expenditures for the favorable tax treatment 
of capital gains held by individuals until death (step-up of basis, which permanently 
exempts all accrued gains from tax). Changes to the percentage of completion method 
refl ected that “the Congress recognized the use of the percentage of completion method 
may produce harsh results for taxpayers in some cases, for example, where an overall 
loss is experienced on the contract, or where actual profi ts are signifi cantly less than 
projected” (Joint Committee on Taxation, 1987, p. 527). Changes to the completed contract 
method, on the other hand, came from a perception in Congress that use of this method 
led to low or negative tax rates and unjustifi ed income deferral, especially among large 
defense contractors.
2 Costs that are not directly allocable to the contract are often referred to as period costs. They are most 
naturally thought of as overhead or common costs that cannot be specifi cally assigned to the activities 
of any one contract. Guthrie and Hines (2008) offer additional details of changes to the tax treatment of 
completed contracts during the 1980s.
3 These issues are reviewed Griswold and Graetz (1976, pp. 588–589).
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The revisions to the percentage of completion method enacted in 1986 removed 
the option of calculating the percentage of completion based on physical completion. 
Furthermore, the percentage of completion calculation must be based on all costs for 
which capitalization is required. A “look-back” adjustment to the tax liability of past 
years was also adopted, permitting taxpayers to receive tax credit to compensate them 
for excess tax payments that may have arisen from calculations based on expected 
income that did not ultimately materialize.
In name, the completed contract method is no longer an option for reporting long term 
contract income. The completed contract method was replaced by the Percentage of 
Completion-Capitalized Cost method (PCCC). In reality, the PCCC method is a hybrid 
of the “old” completed contract method and the “new” percentage of completion method. 
Under the PCCC method, 40 percent of contract income and costs were reported based 
on percentage of completion with a look-back adjustment procedure; the remaining 60 
percent of contract income and costs were reported when the contract is completed.4 
Thus, only 60 percent of the taxable income from the contract could be deferred until 
the contract was completed. The Joint Committee on Taxation (1987) estimated that this 
accounting change alone would augment federal tax revenues by $2.9 billion in 1987, 
$3.3 billion in 1988, $2.3 billion in 1989, and less than $1 billion per year thereafter. 
Furthermore, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the corporate tax rate from 46 per-
cent to 34 percent, and reduced individual tax rates as well, thereby reducing the value 
of accounting methods that defer tax liabilities. The Revenue Act of 1987 reduced the 
percentage of contract income eligible for deferral to 30 percent, so after 1987 at least 
70 percent of contract income was taxed based on percentage of completion.
The effects of these changes to the completed contract method on incentives to adjust 
contract length are illustrated in the following example. Consider a corporation that 
earns $200,000 in profi ts from a contract that takes just one day to complete, and that 
all the costs are incurred and payments received on that day. At the 1981 corporate tax 
rate of 46 percent, the fi rm owes $92,000 in taxes on the profi ts of $200,000; however, 
under the pre-1983 completed contract accounting rules, if the contractor could arrange 
to perform 99 percent of the contract on the fi rst day, and the remaining one percent of 
the contract a year later, then all the taxes would be deferred into the second year. At a 
discount rate of 10 percent, and assuming the contractor incurs 99 percent of its costs 
and receives 99 percent of its payment on the fi rst day, deferral of $91,080 of taxes on 
the fi rst-day profi ts reduces the present value of tax obligations by $9,108. Deferring 
one percent of the contract also means deferring one percent of its after-tax profi ts for 
a year, but in present value this costs the fi rm just $108 (0.54*$2,000*0.1), so the fi rm 
gains $9,000 by deferring the bulk of its tax liability. In 1989, under the PCCC method 
and a 34 percent corporate tax rate, a contractor who performs 99 percent of a contract 
on the fi rst day and the remaining one percent of the contract a year later is eligible to 
4 The PCCC method is to be applied to all contracts that are not accounted for using the straight percentage 
of completion method. Taxpayers who had previously used the more traditional methods, such as the ac-
crual shipment method, were also required to use the PCCC method for their long-term contracts.
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defer taxes on only 30 percent of its $198,000 fi rst-day profi ts, which at a 10 percent 
discount rate is worth $2,190.60; after subtracting the cost of deferring its after-tax profi ts 
of $1,320 on the remaining one percent of the contract, the fi rm gains only $2,058.60. 
Since the net benefi t associated with extending the contract for a year has declined 
from $9,000 under 1981 rules to $2,058.60 under 1989 rules, it is reasonable to expect 
that by 1989 contract lengths might have adjusted in response to the tax law changes.5
III. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTS
The data for the empirical analysis come from the Department of Defense Defense 
Contract Action Data System, for fi scal years 1981 and 1989.  The data consist of all 
contracting actions within the Department of Defense in excess of $10,000 in fi scal year 
1981 and in excess of $25,000 in fi scal year 1989. These data include information on the 
contracting offi ce, action date, type of contract action (e.g., cancellation or modifi cation), 
the type of contract, contractor, type of good or service, place of performance, weapon 
system to which the contract belongs, the expected completion date, and the contract 
value. Nominal dollar contract values were converted to 1987 constant dollars using 
the aggregate price index for government purchases of goods and services for national 
defense. In 1981 there were 374,804 contract actions totaling over $119 billion; in 1989 
there were 222,597 actions worth over $122 billion.
The study uses a subset of the full sample from 1981 and 1989. The sample is limited 
to new contract awards that were negotiated by and for the Department of Defense in 
either 1981 or 1989. Because the data represent all contract actions, the selection criterion 
eliminates modifi cations to existing contracts that can take the form of terminations, 
cancellations, increases in the scope of work, and funding actions, as well as orders from 
contracts let by other Federal agencies or other contracting offi ces within the Department 
of Defense; contracts for sales to foreign governments or international institutions are 
also omitted. The sample in 1989 is further limited by the complication that informa-
tion on the expected completion date was voluntarily supplied by the contracting offi ce. 
Roughly half of the original sample of records contain this information and the sample 
means for the observations with and without the estimated completion date have similar 
values for other variables. Eliminating records with identifi able reporting errors (such 
as negative calculated lengths and dollar values less than zero) narrows the fi nal sample 
size to 165,160 observations, consisting of 121,993 contracts from 1981, and 43,167 
contracts from 1989. The difference between the sizes of these samples refl ects several 
factors, including changes between 1981–1989 in the numbers of annual contract actions 
5 This example takes the discount rate to be unchanging at 10 percent. In an environment in which the 
interest rate was unchanging, the reduction in the corporate tax rate from 46 percent to 34 percent might 
have been expected to raise discount rates; but it is noteworthy that nominal interest rates fell over the 
1980s, further reducing the benefi ts of extending contract length for tax purposes. Annualized three-month 
Treasury bill rates in mid-1981 exceeded 16 percent, and in early 1982 exceeded 12 percent, whereas by 
1989 they were well under 9 percent.
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of the Department of Defense and the higher contract dollar value cutoff for inclusion 
in the 1989 data, which caused the number of contracts reported by the Department 
of Defense to decline by 41 percent between these years. Even more importantly, the 
contracting offi ce was not required to record expected contract completion dates for 
the later contract actions, and did so for only about half of the 1989 contracts, further 
limiting the 1989 sample size. The sample means reported in Table 1 indicate that the 
mean length of a Department of Defense contract in 1989 was roughly 1.2 months 
longer than the mean contract length in 1981, refl ecting the greater dollar value cutoff 
for contracts included in the 1989 data.6
The contracting data indicate the specifi c products or services provided in contracts, 
and separately note the broad Department of Defense procurement program with which 
any contract is identifi ed. For example, the data include contracts to provide the Depart-
ment of Defense with tubing to be used in new ships, contracts to provide tubing for use 
in non-combat vehicles, and other contracts to provide tubing to be used with various 
types of equipment. Ships, non-combat vehicles, and different equipment categories 
all constitute separate procurement programs known as “claimant groups;” by contrast, 
tubing is one of many “product and service” categories. Generally speaking, claimant 
groups correspond to different end uses, whereas product and service groups correspond 
to different categories of inputs.
IV. DETERMINANTS OF CONTRACT LENGTH
Numerous factors other than tax changes infl uenced the duration of defense con-
tracts between 1981–1989. For example, changing defense budgets and the thawing of 
the cold war are likely to have altered acquisition policy in a way that systematically 
affected contract lengths between 1981–1989. Since it is impossible to control for all 
the factors that infl uence contract lengths, it is helpful to identify a treatment group 
of contracts that is most likely to have been affected, and to compare changes in the 
duration of those contracts with a control group of contracts that are unlikely to have 
been so strongly affected.
The nature of the tax changes of the 1980s suggests several different possible groups 
that might be used to test the effect of the tax changes on contracting behavior. Changes 
in allowable accounting methods applied only to long-term contracts, which are defi ned 
as building, installation, construction, and qualifi ed manufacturing contracts that span 
more than one taxable year (since fi rms have different tax calendars, contracts as short 
6 Restricting 1981 contracts to those with dollar values (in real terms) suffi cient to meet the 1989 criterion 
for inclusion produces a sample with a mean contract length virtually identical to that for the 1989 sample 
(the sample mean lengths differ by less than half a day). Rerunning the regressions using this smaller 
sample of 1981 observations together with the 1989 observations produces results that are very similar 
to those presented in Tables 2–4.
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Table 1
Sample Means By Year
Variable 1981 1989
Length (years)  0.57  0.67
Claimant group
 Airframes  3.55  2.80
 Aircraft engines  1.75  2.10
 Other aircraft equipment  4.67  4.68
 Missile & space systems  2.46  3.23
 Ships  6.16  4.32
 Combat vehicles  1.76  1.35
 Non-combat vehicles  1.72  2.05
 Weapons  1.63  1.39
 Ammunition  0.55  1.02
 Electronics & communications equipment 13.27 10.49
 Petroleum  2.35  2.00
 Other fuels & lubricants  0.13  0.23
 Containers & handling equipment  0.04  0.04
 Textiles, clothing & equipage  1.55  1.41
 Building supplies  0.98  0.83
 Subsistence  9.98 12.66
 Transportation equipment (railway)  0.01  0.01
 Production equipment  0.60  0.51
 Construction 14.21 18.79
 Construction equipment  0.33  0.12
 Medical & dental supplies & equipment  2.92  2.27
 Photographic equipment  0.54  0.33
 Material handling equipment  0.42  0.30
 Other supplies & equipment 18.66 16.54




 Fixed price, redetermination  0.03  0.15
 Firm fi xed price 88.51 91.26
 Fixed price, economic price adjustment  5.71  2.71
 Fixed price, incentive  0.15  0.17
 Cost plus, award fee  0.05  0.25
 Cost contract  0.93  1.07
 Cost sharing  0.16  0.11
 Cost plus, fi xed fee  4.02  3.76
 Cost plus, incentive fee  0.12  0.09
 Time & materials  0.24  0.38
 Labor hours  0.08  0.05
Type of contracting action
 Letter   0.44  1.00
 Defi nitive, superseding letter  0.30  0.30
 Defi nitive 99.26 98.70
Type of business1
 Small 58.00 59.46
 Large 33.62 28.76
 Non-profi t  1.7  1.85
 Foreign  6.67  9.93
Place of performance1
 Domestic 93.33 90.09
 U.S. territory  0.34  0.38
 Foreign  6.33  9.53
Subject matter of contract
 Research, development, test & evaluation (RDTE)  4.86  7.22
 Service 23.90 28.68
 Product 71.23 64.10
Dollars ($87 million) 0.413 0.648
N = 121,993 43,167
Notes: Units are percentages of sample unless otherwise indicated. The sample means in the fi rst 
column are for the 121,993 new 1981 contracts of $10,000 or more, whereas the sample means in the 
second column are for the 43,167 new 1989 contracts of $25,000 or more. Mean contracting amounts 
reported in the table are converted to 1987 dollars.
(1) Small, Large and Non-profi t refer to domestic fi rms performing the work in the United States. 
Foreign refers to any fi rm performing the work outside the United States (in a U.S. territory, posses-
sion, or foreign country) as well as domestic fi rms performing outside the United States.
Table 1 (Continued)
Sample Means By Year
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as one month can qualify). Consequently, information on the subject matter of the con-
tracts can be used to identify those contracts that are potentially eligible for long-term 
contract treatment. One group of potentially affected contracts is defi ned by their under-
lying products and services, specifi cally contracts for: supply; research, development, 
test and evaluation; and a subset of service and construction contracts involving the 
installation of equipment, maintenance, repair and rebuilding of equipment, construc-
tion of structures and facilities, maintenance, repair or alteration of real property, and 
modifi cation of equipment.7 It is possible to estimate the extent to which the durations 
of contracts for these products and services changed between 1981–1989, compared 
to contracts providing other products and services. This comparison can control for 
observable contract attributes, including dollar values of the contracts and identities of 
claimant groups in the contracts.
Information on the tax status of the contractor provides another way of identifying the 
effect of tax changes on contract length. Domestic fi rms with taxable earnings from work 
performed in the United States should be most sensitive to U.S. tax changes, whereas 
nonprofi t organizations, foreign fi rms, and domestic fi rms performing work outside 
the United States should be the least sensitive.8 Hence, a second set of treatment and 
control groups can be defi ned as tax sensitive and tax insensitive fi rms.
A third potential classifi cation of treatment and control groups relies on differences 
between claimant groups. Some claimants, such as missile and space systems, tend to 
have large value contracts; large value contracts are on average lengthier than others, 
and therefore more likely to benefi t from the completed contract method of accounting. 
By comparing contracts for specifi ed products (e.g., tubing used in missile and space 
systems) with contracts for the same products used by different claimants (e.g., tubing 
used in other supplies and equipment), it is possible to infer the effects of tax changes 
in a way that abstracts from general changes in markets for these products and services.
The regression reported in the fi rst column of Table 2 estimates contract length (in 
years) as a function of whether its product or service category made the contract likely 
to be eligible for long-term contracting treatment; also included in the regression are a 
1989 year dummy variable, and various characteristics of the contract and contractor. 
The variables measuring contract and contractor characteristics are designed to control 
for that portion of the contract length that can be explained by different mixes of these 
characteristics over the two years. Such explanatory characteristics include: the type 
7 The appendix of Guthrie and Hines (2008) lists the Department of Defense classifi cation of service and 
construction contracts.
8 Some foreign fi rms doing business in the United States are subject to taxation by their home countries, 
which permit them to claim tax credits for income taxes paid to the United States. For these fi rms, U.S. 
taxes are not entirely costs, since they create offsetting credits, which explain the patterns of investment in 
the United States identifi ed by Hines (1996). American fi rms doing business abroad are permitted to defer 
U.S. taxation of their foreign income until it is repatriated to the United States, which reduces effective 
U.S. taxation of this income (Hines, 1994; Desai, Foley and Hines, 2003).
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Table 2












































Claimant dummies Y Y Y
Contract attribute dummies Y Y Y
R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.25
Observations 165,160 165,160 165,160
Notes: The dependent variable in these regressions is contract length (in years). “Eligible item” 
refers to product and service categories most likely to be eligible for the completed contract method 
of accounting. “Year 1989” is a dummy variable that takes the value one in 1989 and zero in 1981. 
“Tax-sensitive contractors” are those other than nonprofi ts, foreign contractors, and others who are 
unlikely to be fully affected by U.S. tax changes. “Dollars” is the dollar value of a contract in bil-
lions of 1987 dollars. All the regressions include dummy variables for claimant groups and contract 
attributes listed in Table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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of contract, classifi ed by the remuneration and, where relevant, the incentive terms of 
the contract; the kind of contract action, or the nature of the fi rst binding document of 
the contract; the type of business or contractor; the geographic place of performance; 
the subject matter of the contract, or the good or service the contract covers; and the 
claimant group for the contract. Since contract characteristics and contract length are 
jointly determined by the contracting parties, a regression that estimates the effect of tax 
provisions on contract length while controlling for other contract terms effectively esti-
mates the extent to which parties are willing to exchange one characteristic for another.9
The estimated coeffi cient of –0.078 in the fi rst column of Table 2 indicates that con-
tracts for the categories of goods and services generally eligible for completed contract 
treatment were somewhat shorter in duration in 1981 than the other contracts, doubt-
less refl ecting the underlying nature of their production processes. The coeffi cient of 
0.173 on the 1989 year dummy indicates that contracts generally lengthened between 
1981–1989, and the coeffi cient of –0.067 on the interaction of eligible goods and ser-
vices and the 1989 dummy variable implies that contracts potentially affected by the tax 
change showed a smaller increase, the difference being 0.067 years (roughly 3.5 weeks), 
or 10 percent of mean contract length. This regression also includes dummy variables 
for all of the claimant groups and contract attributes (e.g., type of contract and type of 
contracting action) listed in Table 1,10 and contract value (in billions of 1987 dollars); 
the 6.699 coeffi cient on contract dollar value indicates that an additional one billion 
dollars of contract value is associated with a 6.699 year lengthening of contract duration.
There is potential imprecision in the classifi cation of the treatment group in this 
regression, particularly in the case of service contracts. To address this issue, the regres-
sions were re-estimated using differing defi nitions of the treatment and control groups. 
Based on the listing of broad service and construction contract groups in the appendix of 
Guthrie and Hines (2008), the control group was changed to include: research, develop-
ment, test and evaluation contracts; maintenance, repair and rebuilding of equipment 
contracts; repair or alteration of real property contracts; and contracts that deal with 
the construction-related work of architects and engineers. The sign of the estimated 
tax effect remained the same in all of these regressions, with the estimated effect on 
contract duration varying from 0.027–0.126 years.
Column 2 of Table 2 reports coeffi cient estimates from a regression in which the 
treatment group is contracts with tax-sensitive contractors, and the control group is 
contracts with tax insensitive contractors, including nonprofi t contractors, foreign con-
tractors, and others who are unlikely to be able to benefi t from the completed contract 
method of accounting. The coeffi cient of 0.099 in column 2 indicates that tax-sensitive 
fi rms generally had longer contracts than others in 1981, and the coeffi cient of –0.109 
implies that this difference disappeared (and slightly reversed) by 1989. The coeffi cient 
 9 Estimated tax effects remain signifi cant when contract dollar values and contract type variables are omitted 
from the regressions.
10 Coeffi cient estimates on these dummy variables are reported in Guthrie and Hines (2008).
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of –0.109 corresponds to a shortening of roughly fi ve weeks for contracts with taxable 
contractors, representing a difference of 16 percent of mean contract length in 1989.
Column 3 of Table 2 reports estimated coeffi cients from a regression that uses both 
contract content and the tax status of contractors to identify the treatment group. The 
coeffi cient of –0.303 indicates that contracts shortened signifi cantly in duration between 
1981–1989 for tax-sensitive contractors in the product and service categories most 
amenable to completed contract treatment, compared to contracts with tax-insensitive 
contractors in the same product and service categories. This is against a background in 
which defense contracts generally increased in length between 1981–1989, though this 
contract lengthening was more pronounced for contracts unaffected by the tax change. 
Among tax-sensitive fi rms, contracts for products and services eligible for completed 
contract treatment fell in length between 1981–1989 by 0.118 years (0.303 – 0.185 
= 0.118) compared to contracts for products and services less likely to be eligible 
for special tax treatment, a difference of roughly 1.4 months, or 18 percent of mean 
contract length.11
The regressions presented in Table 2 identify the effects of changes in the tax treatment 
of completed contracts by comparing contracts likely to have been affected with those 
that are unlikely to have been affected. This comparison implicitly assumes that changes 
in other features of the economic and contracting environment infl uence both groups 
equally, and this assumption may or may not be valid; furthermore, it is untested. It is 
possible that conditions changed between 1981–1989 for nonprofi t and foreign contrac-
tors in a manner different from the way in which they changed for other contractors, 
or that the markets for the products and services most eligible for completed contract 
treatment changed systematically relative to markets for other products and services — 
and that these changes were unrelated to the tax developments. The regressions in Table 
2 include dummy variables that control for Department of Defense claimant groups, 
so the estimates are based on changes in contract length between different products 
being supplied under (for example) missile and space system contracts, but that does 
not entirely address the issue that the markets for the underlying products may change 
differently over this time period.
The Department of Defense data allow the use of a different method of identifying 
treatment and control groups, one based on claimants rather than products and services. 
Larger value contracts tend to have longer duration, as refl ected in the consistently posi-
tive coeffi cients on the dollar values of contracts in the contract length regressions. It is 
11 Only contracts for manufactured goods must exceed 12 months to qualify for long-term status; all other 
eligible contracts qualify if the contract spans more than one taxable year. Hence, it is possible that contracts 
as short as 2 months might qualify for long-term status and would be sensitive to the change in allow-
able accounting methods. Longer contracts are, however, more likely than others to span taxable years, 
and longer contracts, with their greater average dollar values, offer greater benefi ts from extensions into 
subsequent tax years. Guthrie and Hines (2008) report quantile regressions intended to test whether the 
lengths of longer contracts are most sensitive to the tax changes; while there is some evidence that they 
are, the results suggest that tax effects persist for all contract lengths.
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possible to rank Department of Defense claimant groups by the median dollar values of 
their contracts in 1981, and to compare changes between 1981–1989 in the lengths of 
contracts by claimant groups that tend to have high dollar values with those that tend 
to have low dollar values. The contracts for claimant groups with high dollar values are 
the most likely to benefi t from the completed contract method of accounting in 1981, 
and therefore exhibit larger changes between 1981–1989. One of the benefi ts of defi n-
ing the treatment group in this way is it permits the inclusion of dummy variables for 
both 1981 and 1989 for the products and services that contractors supply the claimants, 
thereby controlling for product- and service-specifi c market changes between 1981–
1989.
The regressions presented in Table 3 include observations of contracts for those 
Department of Defense claimant groups with median contract values in the top one-
third and the bottom one-third of all claimant groups in 1981. As a result, the sample 
size is reduced to 118,879 observations. The more expensive contracts appeared among 
claimant groups for petroleum, other fuels and lubricants, construction, ammunition, 
missile and space systems, textiles, production equipment, and containers and handling 
equipment; the least expensive contracts appeared among claimant groups for airframes, 
ships, aircraft engines, weapons, other aircraft equipment, other supplies and equip-
ment, medical and dental supplies, building supplies, and subsistence. It is noteworthy 
that large-ticket items such as airframes and ships entail low-value (and also shorter) 
contracts, but this refl ects the nature of Department of Defense contracting, in which the 
majority of the contracts for these projects represent small pieces of the total enterprise. 
Contracts for the more expensive claimant groups are treated as eligible for tax benefi ts 
in 1981, and contracts for the less expensive claimant groups are the control variables. 
The dependent variable in these regressions is again contract length, and they include the 
same controls for contract type, business type, subject matter, and the real value of the 
contract amount as those used in the regressions reported in Table 2; however, instead 
of dummy variables for claimant groups, the regressions include dummy variables for 
the 102 different product and service categories in each of the two sample years, or 
204 product and service dummy variables altogether. Since time-specifi c product and 
service dummy variables are included, the 1989 year dummy variable is not included 
as a regressor in the regressions reported in Table 3.
The estimated coeffi cient of –0.362 in the fi rst column of Table 3 indicates that, con-
trolling for contract value, contract type, product type, and other contract characteristics, 
as well as the underlying product or service, contracts were 0.362 of a year shorter for 
high value claimant groups than for low value claimant groups in 1981. This clearly does 
not refl ect tax incentives, which create incentives for the opposite pattern, but instead 
refl ect the differing nature of the product and service composition of these contracts. 
The coeffi cient of –0.0314 in the fi rst column of Table 4 indicates that contracts in the 
high value claimant group shortened in length between 1981–1989 by a small amount, 
3.14 percent of a year, or about 11 days, relative to those in the control group.
The estimates reported in column 2 of Table 3 are based on the distinction between 
tax-sensitive and tax-insensitive contractors. The coeffi cient of –0.286 in column 2 
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Table 3







































Product-year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Contract attribute dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 118,879 118,879 118,879
Notes: The dependent variable in these regressions is contract length (in years), and the sample is 
restricted to contracts with high value claimant groups and low value claimant groups. “Eligible 
contract” refers to contracts for high value claimant groups that are most likely to be eligible for 
the completed contract method of accounting. “Tax-sensitive contractors” are those other than 
nonprofi ts, foreign contractors, and others who are unlikely to be fully affected by U.S. tax changes. 
“Dollars” is the dollar value of a contract in billions of 1987 dollars. All the regressions include 
dummy variables for 102 separate product groups by year, and dummies for contract attributes 
listed in Table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses.
suggests that, controlling for contract attributes and product categories, the average 
lengths of contracts in this sample with tax-sensitive contractors were shortened by 3.4 
months between 1981–1989 compared to the lengths of contracts with tax-insensitive 
contractors. This is more than twice the magnitude of the corresponding coeffi cient in the 
second column of Table 2, refl ecting the impact of controlling for product-year specifi c 
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effects (and possibly the different sample composition). The estimates reported in the 
third column of Table 4 include interactions among the variables used in the regressions 
reported in columns 1 and 2; the estimated coeffi cient of –0.434 indicates that the rela-
tive shortening of contract lengths among tax-sensitive contractors between 1981–1989 
was strongly concentrated among those providing contracts to claimant groups whose 
contracts were most likely to have been eligible for long-term tax treatment in 1981. 
Table 4








































Product-year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Contract attribute dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,736 3,736 3,736
Notes: The dependent variable in these regressions is contract length (in years), and the sample 
is restricted to contracts for ammunition and weapon claimant groups. “Ammunition contract” 
refers to contracts for the ammunition claimant group, which are likely to be eligible for the 
completed contract method of accounting. “Tax-sensitive contractors” are those other than non-
profi ts, foreign contractors, and others who are unlikely to be fully affected by U.S. tax changes. 
“Dollars” is the dollar value of a contract in billions of 1987 dollars. All the regressions include 
dummy variables for 102 separate product groups by year, and dummies for contract attributes 
listed in Table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Among tax-sensitive fi rms, contracts for high value claimant groups fell in length by 
0.083 years (0.434 + 0.031 – 0.382 = 0.083) compared to contracts with conatractors 
less likely to be eligible for special tax treatment, a difference of one month, or 12 
percent of mean contract length.
It is possible to use subsets of the contracting data to compare changes in contract 
length between roughly comparable claimant groups that differ in the average dollar 
values, and therefore the average lengths, of their contracts. Ammunition and weapons 
offer one such breakdown; the median ammunition contract in 1981 exceeded $94,000 
in 1987 dollars, whereas the median weapons contract was less than $36,000. (A sig-
nifi cant fraction of weapons contracts are for limited quantities of small arms, whereas 
ammunition contracts tend to be for greater dollar amounts, refl ecting bulk purchases 
of ammunition.) Table 4 presents estimated coeffi cients from regressions that repeat 
the specifi cations used in Table 3, but for this much smaller (3,736 observations) set 
of contracts. The coeffi cient of 0.040 in the fi rst column indicates that, conditional on 
contract value, contract type, product content, and other characteristics, ammunition 
contracts were half a month longer than those for weapons in 1981. The coeffi cient of 
–0.172 implies that contracts among ammunition claimants fell in length by two months 
relative to those for weapons claimants between 1981–1989. The regression reported in 
column 2 of Table 4 identifi es tax effects based on contractor tax status. The coeffi cient 
of –0.196 in that column indicates that the lengths of taxable contracts declined by 2.4 
months compared to those of more lightly taxed contracts between 1981–1989, though 
this effect is not statistically signifi cant.
Column 3 presents estimated coeffi cients from a regression that includes a full range 
of interactions among the independent variables. The coeffi cient of –0.457 indicates 
that the combination of tax-sensitive status, ammunition contracts, and 1989 timing is 
associated with signifi cantly shorter contracts. The coeffi cient estimates in this equa-
tion imply that, controlling for other factors, ammunition contracts with tax-sensitive 
providers were 0.186 years longer in 1981 than they were in 1989 (0.457 – 0.265 – 
0.016 = 0.186).  Since the independent variables include product-year categories, this 
comparison controls for any lengthening of contracts attributable to underlying product 
categories. The resulting difference of 2.2 months is 23 percent of the average length 
(0.823 years) of ammunition and weapons contracts in this sample.
V. CONCLUSION
The experience of the 1980s strongly suggests that Department of Defense contract 
provisions are sensitive to their federal income tax treatment. In response to reduc-
tions in the favorable tax treatment of long term contracts, average contract length 
fell by between one to two months, or 12–23 percent of mean contract length. From 
this evidence it appears that the Department of Defense does not fully incorporate the 
effect of its procurement decisions on federal income tax revenue, and as a result, con-
sciously or unconsciously encourages provision modes that benefi t from favorable tax 
treatment.
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The sizable tax expenditure associated with long term contracting prior to the 1980s 
represented a signifi cant subsidy to military procurement that was not captured in stan-
dard budget entries for federal outlays. Whether it is better for the federal government 
to fi nance programs through tax subsidies or direct budgetary outlays is an ages-old 
question, given new life in recent decades by the work of Stanley Surrey (e.g., Surrey, 
1973) in promoting the tax expenditure budget. More recent scholarship (e.g., Dharma-
pala, 1999; Weisbach and Nussim, 2004) offers mixed assessments of tax expenditures 
and outlay alternatives, noting the advantages and disadvantages of each in different 
settings. There could be circumstances in which outcomes are unaffected by whether 
the government uses tax expenditures or direct outlays to fi nance its programs, and if 
ever there were to be such a case, it is likely to be one in which the government itself is 
the ultimate consumer. Yet the evidence is that military procurement is affected by the 
form that tax benefi ts take, very likely refl ecting the decentralized behavior of military 
agencies pursuing objectives without fully incorporating their effects on other parts of 
the government. Hence as a practical matter tax expenditures and direct outlays are 
not equivalent even from the standpoint of government procurement, and the failure 
of this equivalence implies that there are real consequences to alternative methods of 
fi nancing government programs.
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